We introduce a combinatorial variant of the cost sharing problem: several services can be provided to each player and each player values every combination of services di erently. A publicly known cost function speci es the cost of providing every possible combination of services. A combinatorial cost sharing mechanism is a protocol that decides which services each player gets and at what price. We look for dominant strategy mechanisms that are (economically) e cient and cover the cost, ideally without overcharging (i.e., budget balanced). Note that unlike the standard cost sharing se ing, combinatorial cost sharing is a multi-parameter domain. is makes designing dominant strategy mechanisms with good guarantees a challenging task.
INTRODUCTION
In the cost sharing problem the cost of a public good (e.g., a bridge, a park, or a networking infrastructure) has to be partitioned among the players. e challenge is to decide whether to provision the public good, and if so, which players will receive usage permissions and for what prices, all while making sure that the payments cover the cost. e problem was extensively studied in both economics and algorithmic game theory and many variants were suggested and analyzed (e.g., [2, 3, 8, 16-19, 21, 23] ). However, in almost all variants only a single good is considered.
In this paper we a empt to ll this lacuna and introduce combinatorial cost sharing, where multiple goods can be provisioned and both costs and preferences depend on the selected combination of goods. While combinatorial cost sharing is a natural generalization of the basic cost sharing scenario, from a technical perspective it is radically di erent as we leave the relatively safe single parameter world and cross the bridge to the realm of multi parameter mechanism design. Nevertheless, we will see that good mechanisms for combinatorial cost sharing do exist. e rst author is the incumbent of the Lilian and George Ly le Career Development Chair. Work supported in part by the 1 Shahar Dobzinski and Shahar Ovadia Simple Cost Sharing e standard cost sharing se ing (from now on, "simple cost sharing") involves a set N of players (|N | = n), where the value of player i is i if player i receives a usage permission and 0 otherwise. A known cost function C : 2 N → R + speci es the cost of serving each subset of the players. A (direct) mechanism for this problem receives as input the valuations of the players and outputs the set of served players and the payment p i of every player i. It is standard to assume that the mechanism is individually rational (for every i, p i ≤ i ), that p i ≥ 0 (no positive transfers) and moreover p i = 0 if player i is not served.
Work on cost sharing in the AGT community mostly focuses on incentive compatible mechanisms, either dominant strategy or groupstrategyproof, that at the very least always cover the cost. at is, in an instance where the mechanism serves the set ALG of players, C (ALG) ≤ Σ i p i . Ideally, we will also not overcharge the players, at least not by much: a mechanism is β-budget balanced if in every instance C (ALG) ≤ Σ i p i ≤ β · C (ALG).
We look for mechanisms that are economically e cient. Economic e ciency can be interpreted in several ways, with the social welfare being the standard de nition: SW (S ) = Σ i ∈S i − C (S ). Unfortunately, Feigenbaum et al. [10] show that no dominant strategy and budget balanced mechanism provides a nite approximation to the social welfare, and this result holds even if we only require the mechanism to cover the cost 1 .
To overcome this, Roughgarden and Sundararajan [23] suggest an alternative quanti cation of e ciency. First, one can use additive approximations, i.e., if OPT is the allocation that maximizes the welfare, then in every instance SW (OPT ) − SW (ALG) ≤ α ·C (OPT ), for some reasonable α > 0.
is benchmark allows the designer to shi the focus from instances with "low" welfare -which are the raison d'etre of the impossibilities -to instances in which using a cost sharing mechanism should yield a noticeable improvement in the e ciency.
A related notion discussed in [23] is minimizing the social cost, π (S ) = C (S ) + Σ i S i , which is the construction cost plus the "lost value" from not serving some of the players. Interestingly, the social cost and the social welfare induce the same order on the allocations (i.e., if SW (S ) ≥ SW (T ) then π (S ) ≤ π (T )). Moreover, additive approximations to the social welfare imply multiplicative guarantees on the social cost: SW (OPT )−SW (ALG) ≤ α ·C (OPT ) implies π (ALG) ≤ (α +1)·π (OPT ). Following [23] , many papers study social cost minimization in various se ings (e.g., [2, 3, 5, 7, 14, 18] . For the sake of compatibility with the literature, we state our results in terms of approximation to the social cost, but in fact we prove essentially the same guarantees with respect to the stronger notion of additive approximation. e cost sharing literature is rich in beautiful results, but the jewel in the crown is probably the Shapley value mechanism [21] , which is a groupstrategyproof mechanism that exactly shares the cost whenever C is a submodular function [21] . Roughgarden and Sundararajan [23] show that it gives an approximation ratio of H n = Σ n i=1 1 n to the social cost. It is known that the approximation ratio of any mechanism that always covers the cost is Ω(log n) and that this is true even if we relax the incentive compatibility requirement to strategyproofness [9] 2 . 1 is impossibility is typical for mixed sign objectives, like the social welfare. e simple proof is instructive: consider two players, each with i = 1. e cost of serving any non-empty set is 1. e social welfare of the optimal allocation (which is to serve both players) is 1, whereas the social welfare of any other allocation is 0. erefore, in any mechanism that provides a nite approximation to the welfare both players are served. To cover the cost, one of the players, without loss of generality player 1, must pay p > 0. Consider now an instance with 1 =
The Model e main purpose of this paper is to go beyond the single good se ing. Toward this end, we introduce combinatorial cost sharing. We present two formulations of combinatorial cost sharing. e rst is a more direct formulation which might help the reader to digest the se ing more easily. e second formulation -which is the one that is studied throughout the paper -is equivalent in power but is notationally more involved. We use it since it makes the technical proofs more readable.
A First A empt. As in simple cost sharing, there is a set N which consists of n players, but now there is a set M of public goods (for example, a pool, a gym, etc.). e mechanism has to decide which goods to construct and if a good is constructed, which subset of the players will be allowed to use it. Players might have complicated preferences over the goods in M (e.g., a combined membership for the pool and the gym might be more valuable than the sum of the values of each membership alone), thus the private valuation of player i is i : 2 M → R. Note that this assumes that there are no externalities in the sense that value of each player is determined only by the goods he is served (in particular, the value does not depend on the other players who use these services).
Let C : (2 N ) m → R be a known function that speci es the cost of every possible combination of services. For example, C (S 1 , . . . , S n ) is the cost of serving the rst good in M to the players in S 1 while serving the second good in M to the players in S 2 , and so on. We stress that we do not make any assumptions on S 1 , . . . , S n and in particular these sets are typically not disjoint. e Main Formulation. e issue with the rst formulation is that we o en would like to assume that the cost function belongs to some standard class, e.g., C is submodular or subadditive. However, as de ned C is not even a set function (its domain is (2 N ) m ). We thus use a di erent formulation that is equivalent in power. De ne -for notational convenience -for each player i a set M i with M i ∩ M i = ∅ for i i , where each j ∈ M i represents a permission to consume a di erent good. For example, if M is the set of public goods that can be constructed, we de ne for each player i a set M i , |M i | = |M |, and think about the j'th item in M i as permission for player i to use the j'th public good in M. In particular player i is never interested in items from M i , for i i . e private valuation of player i is i : 2 M i → R. e cost function C : 2 M 1 × · · · × 2 M n → R speci es the cost of every possible combination of services. Note that it is straightforward to express every cost function in the rst formulation as a cost function in the main formulation. In particular, C is now a set function (the set of items is M 1 ∪ · · · ∪ M n -recall that M i ∩ M j for i j), so standard notions such as subadditivity and submodularity are de ned in the usual sense.
Other Requirements. Due to the combinatorial richness of our domain, we are not able to develop good groupstrategyproof mechanisms. Instead, we focus on dominant strategy ones. Following the literature, we focus on mechanisms that satisfy individual rationality, no positive transfers and always cover the cost or maybe are even β-budget balanced, for some reasonable β. We naturally extend the social cost de nition of [23] to multiple goods:
I.e., we still want to minimize the construction cost plus the lost value. We note that the extended de nition preserves the properties discussed above, e.g., additive approximations to the welfare lead to multiplicative approximations to the social cost. We refer the reader to the preliminaries section for exact de nitions.
Cost Recovering Mechanisms and the Potential Mechanism e simple cost sharing domain is a single parameter one, where the private information of every player consists of one number. us, to design a dominant strategy mechanism one can focus on the [19] and acyclic mechanisms [18] ). In contrast, the combinatorial cost sharing domain is a multi-parameter one. e di culty of designing useful mechanisms for multi-parameter domains is well known. e root of evil is the lack of general design techniques except the VCG family. For example, if the domain is unrestricted, then the only possible dominant strategy mechanisms are a ne maximizers [22] , a slight variation of VCG mechanisms. In general, more restricted domains as ours do exhibit non VCG mechanisms, but the VCG family remains the main tool at our disposal.
However, while VCG is e ective for welfare maximization, in cost sharing se ings we also need to cover the construction cost. Unfortunately, conventional wisdom has it that the revenue of the VCG mechanism is uncontrollable and tends to be low 3 [1] . e main technical contribution of this paper challenges this -we do manage to "tame" the VCG beast and obtain VCG based mechanisms that are approximately budget balanced.
For simplicity, we start our journey by constructing VCG based mechanisms that always cover the cost for simple cost sharing, so the valuation of each player i can be described by a single number: i if served and 0 otherwise. In general, a ne maximizers can have both (multiplicative) player weights and (additive) allocations weights. e former does not seem to be very useful, so we focus on a ne maximizers of the form:
where H : 2 N → R is a function that does not depend on the i 's. If S is the allocation that maximizes (1) for the valuation pro le , then the payment of player i is:
where S −i is the allocation that maximizes (1) when the valuation of player i is identically 0. When H is the cost function C, we get a welfare maximizing mechanism. However, it is common for this mechanism to run a de cit, e.g., in the special case of excludable public good (C (S ) = 1 for every S ∅), if i > 1 for every player i, the revenue is 0. us, to cover the incurred cost we need some other function H C. Notice that from the de nition of
Hence, the payment of the i'th player p i is at least H (S ) − H (S − {i}). A function H with the property that for every set S ⊆ N it holds that i ∈S H (S ) − H (S − {i}) ≥ C (S ) will lead to a dominant-strategy mechanism for simple cost sharing that always collects payments that cover the incurred cost. For example, in the special case of excludable public good, we can choose H (S ) = H |S | , so if a set S is selected the marginal cost to H of each player i ∈ S is at least H (S ) − H (S − {i}) = 1 |S | and the total payment is at least 1 (this special case was analyzed by Blumrosen and Dobzinski [4] ).
Interestingly, for every cost function C the potential function of Hart and Mas-Colell [15] satis es these properties. Given a cooperative game with a set N of players and a cost function C, the potential function is the unique function for which the sum of marginal contributions of every coalition equals its cost, i.e., for every S ⊆ N ,
e potential function has several interesting properties, e.g., the marginal contribution P C (i |S ) coincides with the Shapley value of player i in the coalition S ∪ {i}. In addition, it is also known that the worst-case welfare loss of the Shapley mechanism for simple cost sharing is given by P C (OPT ) [21] .
We generalize and adapt the potential function to our needs: the potential function as de ned in [15] considers cooperative games, i.e., the cost function de ned on subsets of N . Our generalization considers allocations. Speci cally, we de ne the marginal contribution of player i to the allocation
We set the function H as in (1) to be our generalization of the potential function, and name the new mechanism, a VCG mechanism using the potential function, the Potential Mechanism. Notice that this gives a dominant strategy cost-recovering mechanism for every cost function C. We are also able to prove e ciency guarantees if the cost function C is subadditive. Combined together, we get the following general result:
eorem: Let C be a subadditive cost function. en, the Potential mechanism always recovers the cost and provides an approximation ratio of 2H n to the social cost. If C is submodular (or even XOS) the approximation ratio improves to H n .
Again, the approximation ratio is essentially tight due to the impossibility of [9] . For simple cost sharing, there is a dominant-strategy cost recovering mechanism that provides an approximation ratio of H n for any cost function, by running the Shapley value mechanism "on top" of the VCG mechanism [25] . Other works that focus on cost recovering mechanisms are [11, 12] . In particular, [12] handles some multi-parameter domains. However, their results are obtained via a reduction to the single parameter se ing, e.g., by assuming additive valuations or considering "all or nothing" solutions. is approach leads to poor approximation ratios -linear in the number of goods.
The Main Result e main technical e ort of this work is in identifying three se ings in which the potential mechanism is not only e cient and cost recovering, but also budget balanced.
eorem: Let C be a submodular cost function. e Potential Mechanism is H n -budget-balanced and provides an approximation ratio of H n to the social cost in each of the following se ings:
• Supermodular valuations.
• General symmetric valuations and player-wise symmetric cost function 4 .
• Two players (n = 2) with general valuations.
Some results were already known for some special cases of the symmetric se ing, but even then submodular valuations are required: Mehta et al. [18] consider non-metric fault-tolerant uncapacitated facility location. Bleischwitz and Schoppmann [3] study metric fault tolerant uncapacitated facility location. e mechanisms of Mehta et al. and of Bleischwitz and Schoppmann are actually generalizations of Moulin mechanisms [19, 21] and rely in their core on pushing single parameter cost sharing techniques to their limit. In contrast, in the symmetric se ing our mechanism does not make any assumption on the valuations, except monotonicity.
Limitations and Impossibilities
Our results are tight in several aspects. First, even for excludable public good there is an instance in which the approximation ratio of the potential mechanism is Θ(log n) and the mechanism is Θ(log n) budget balanced. Actually, this is true for every VCG-based mechanism that uses a symmetric function 5 
eorem: Let A be a symmetric VCG-based mechanism for the excludable public good problem (i.e., a mechanism that maximizes i i (S i ) − H ( S ) for some symmetric H ) which always covers the incurred cost. Suppose that A provides an approximation ratio of n 1−ϵ to the social cost, for some ϵ > 0. en, there is an instance in which both the approximation ratio is Ω(log n) and the sum of payments collected by the mechanism is Ω(log n) times the incurred cost.
Next we show that one cannot forgo the assumption of a restricted cost function since there is a (non-subadditive) cost function for which the approximation ratio of the potential mechanism is Ω(n). Moreover, the potential mechanism is Ω(n)-budget-balanced for a submodular cost function and unit demand valuations (a simple case of submodular valuations). A full mapping of the families for which the potential mechanism provides good approximation ratios is an open problem.
We also show that while one have many possible choices for the function H in (1), the choice to use the potential function is not arbitrary: consider a cost-recovering VCG based mechanism
Open estions
Our work leaves many exciting questions open. We discuss some of them now.
Computational Issues. In this work we focused on proving the existence of mechanisms with good guarantees. An interesting question is to understand whether there are mechanisms with good guarantees that are computationally e cient. We do not know the answer in general, but we do note that in the case of supermodular valuations and a submodular cost function the potential mechanism is computationally e cient whenever the value of the potential function is easy to compute. To see this, we point out that one of our results states that the potential function of a submodular cost function is submodular as well. erefore, maximizing i i (S i ) −P C ( S ) reduces to the problem of maximizing a supermodular function, which is equivalent to minimizing submodular function. Minimizing a submodular function can be done in polynomial time [24] assuming oracle access to the potential function. Now observe that the potential function is easy to evaluate given the Shapley values (since the marginals of the potential function correspond to Shapley values). We conclude that in this case the potential mechanism is easy to compute whenever computing Shapley values is easy.
e Performance of the Potential Mechanism. We identi ed three se ings in which the potential mechanism is H n -budget-balanced and provides an approximation ratio of H n to the social cost. When the cost function is subadditive, the social cost approximation is 2H n , but it is not clear whether we get budget balance for some interesting classes of valuations. A rst step in this direction will be to determine the overcharging of the potential mechanism for simple cost sharing when the cost function is subadditive.
Other Mechanisms for Combinatorial Cost Sharing. e potential mechanism is a VCG-based mechanism. Are there non VCG-based mechanisms with good guarantees, especially for se ings in which the potential mechanism fails to deliver, e.g., submodular cost and valuation functions? e Power of GSP vs. Strategyproof Mechanisms. We know very li le about groupstrategyproof mechanisms for combinatorial cost sharing. In the full version we provide a mechanism that guarantees a poor approximation ratio of Ω(n). Are there be er groupstrategyproof mechanisms?
Impossibilities for Combinatorial Cost Sharing. e potential mechanism provides an approximation ratio of H n to the social cost and is H n -budget-balanced for supermodular valuations and submodular cost functions. Is there a strategyproof combinatorial cost-sharing mechanism for submodular cost function and supermodular valuation functions which is β-budget-balanced and provides approximation ratio of ρ to the social cost, where β, ρ < H n ?
In particular, the only unrestricted impossibility result that applies to combinatorial cost sharing is the Ω(log n) bound to the social cost of [9] which is proved for the restricted case of excludable public good. It seems that completely new ideas are needed to prove the optimality of the potential mechanism in richer combinatorial se ings.
PRELIMINARIES
In combinatorial cost sharing we have a set N of n players and M = n i=1 M i a set of services, where for every i j: M i ∩ M j = ∅. Every player i ∈ N has a valuation function i :
ere is a cost function C : 2 M 1 × . . . × 2 M n → R + that speci es the cost of every possible allocation of services. e output is ( S, p) where S i ⊆ M i is the allocation of services to player i, and p i ≥ 0 is player i's payment.
We assume that the cost function and the valuations are monotone (i.e., S ⊆ T implies C (S ) ≤ C (T ) and i (S ) ≤ i (T )) and normalized (i.e., C (∅) = 0 and i (∅) = 0).
We note that since the M i 's are disjoint then 2 M = 2 M 1 × . . . × 2 M n . us, we sometimes refer to functions from 2 M 1 × . . . × 2 M n as functions from 2 M , e.g., C (S 1 , . . . , S n ) will be denoted C n i=1 S i , where S i ⊆ M i for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In addition, For a vector of pairwise disjoint sets S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) and a set T ⊆ M i we let S − T be the vector (S 1 , ..., S i−1 , S i − T , S i+1 , ..., S n ). We similarly de ne the usual set operations (e.g., union) between two vectors of disjoint sets S, T as applying this operation on all pairs of the form (S i ,T i ).
Note that simple cost sharing is a special case of combinatorial cost sharing: set |M i | = 1 for every player i. In this case |M | = |N | and we may think of S ⊆ N as a set of served players: i ∈ S if S i ∅. An important special case of simple cost sharing is excludable public good: C ( S ) = 1 for every S (∅, ..., ∅) and C (∅) = 0.
A (direct) combinatorial cost sharing mechanism takes the valuations of the players and outputs an allocation of services and prices. In this paper we consider only mechanisms that satisfy individual rationality (IR), if the mechanism charges player i an amount p i , then p i ≤ i (S i ). A second requirement is no positive transfers (NPT), meaning that p i ≥ 0. We now discuss other desired properties of mechanisms.
Incentive Compatibility. e focus of most this paper is in dominant-strategy mechanisms: a combinatorial cost-sharing mechanism is strategyproof or truthful (in dominant strategies), if for every player i with valuation function i and for every other valuation function i it holds that , p) and ( S , p ) are the outputs of the mechanism for and ( i , −i ), respectively. Groupstrategyproofness will be de ned when needed, in the full version. Budget Balance. A cost-sharing mechanism is budget-balanced if the payments charged from the players cover exactly the incurred cost, i.e. if the mechanism's output is ( S, p) then i ∈N p i = C ( S ).
is notion can be relaxed: a cost-sharing mechanism is β-budget-balanced (for β ≥ 1) if for every valuation pro le and every cost function the mechanism outputs a services allocation S and payments vector p such that
Economic E ciency. Roughgarden and Sundararajan [23] suggested to quantify the ine ciency of cost-sharing mechanisms by the notion of social cost, denoted π (S ), which is the incurred cost of the mechanism plus the excluded values. We extend the de nition of the social cost to the combinatorial se ing:
A cost sharing mechanism is a ρ-approximation to the social cost if for every valuation pro le the social cost of its outcome S is at most ρ ≥ 1 times that of the allocation − −− → OPT that minimizes the social cost: π ( S ) ≤ ρ · π ( − −− → OPT ).
Cost and Valuation Functions. A function
is supermodular if for every two sets S,T ⊆ M i , it holds that (S ) + (T ) ≤ (S ∪T ) + (S ∩T ). Equivalently, for every two sets T ⊆ S and an element x ∈ M − S it holds that (T ∪ {x }) − (T ) ≤ (S ∪ {x }) − (S ). A function : 2 M → R is symmetric if for every two sets S,T ⊆ M i with |S | = |T | it holds that (S ) = (T ). is additive if for every S it holds that (S ) = j ∈S ({j}). is XOS if there exists additive valuations a 1 , . . . , a t such that for every S, (S ) = max r a r (S ). e class of submodular valuations is contained in the class of XOS valuations which is contained in the class of subadditive valuations, and these containments are strict.
THE POTENTIAL FUNCTION AND ITS PROPERTIES
e potential mechanism is an a ne maximizer whose output allocation is de ned by:
where H : 2 M 1 × · · · × 2 M n → R is a publicly known function. In this section we describe the function H we use and its properties. e function H we use is an adaptation of the Potential Function of Hart and Mas-Colell [15] . Given a cooperative game with N players and cost function C, Hart and Mas-Colell de ne a potential function to be a normalized function in which the sum of discrete gradients of any set of players N equals the cost C (N ). We naturally extend this de nition:
De nition 3.1 (potential function for combinatorial cost sharing). Given a normalized cost function C : 2 M 1 × · · · × 2 M n → R + we de ne a potential function P C : 2 M 1 × · · · × 2 M n → R + to be any normalized function with the following property:
• For every allocation S = (S 1 , ..., S n ) such that S i ⊆ M i , the sum of discrete gradients of the function is exactly the cost: i ∈N P C S − P C S − S i = C S . Notice that for simple cost sharing the de nitions of [15] and ours coincide. e proof of the next proposition essentially follows from [15] . We bring it in the full version for completeness. P 3.2. For every normalized cost function C there is a unique potential function P C . Moreover, it holds that P C ( S ) = I ⊆N
.
Following [15] , there are a couple of useful observations related to the potential function. First, by rearranging:
. Notice the D( S, l ) is the expected density (cost divided by the number of players) of a set I of players that is chosen uniformly at random among all sets of size l, when each player i ∈ I is served S i and player i I is not served at all. us, P C ( S ) equals the sum of expected densities of sets of size 1, . . . , n.
A second observation (again, following [15] ) is that the marginal utility P C ( S ) − P C ( S − S i ) equals the Shapley value of player i in the cooperative game with N players and cost function C , where the cost of serving a set T is C (T ) = C (∪ i ∈T S i ).
We now use these observations to prove several useful properties of our potential function. C 3.3. Let C be a monotone cost function. e potential function P C is monotone as well. Furthermore, if C is submodular then P C is submodular as well.
P
. Observe that P C (·) is a sum of functions C (∪ i ∈I S i ), each multiplied by a constant 1
Each of these functions is monotone because C is monotone. Since a sum of monotone functions is monotone as well, we conclude that P C is monotone. e second part of the claim is almost identical, by replacing "monotone" with "submodular" in the previous paragraph.
Next we prove that for every submodular cost function C and S, H n · C ( S ) ≥ P C ( S ) ≥ C ( S ). We also prove a similar bound for subadditive cost functions. P 3.4. Let C be an XOS (in particular, submodular) cost function. en, for every S, P C ( S ) ≥ C ( S ). If C is subadditive then for every S, P C ( S ) ≥ C ( S ) 2 . P . We will need the following folklore claim: C 3.5. Let C : 2 N → R be a monotone function. Choose a set T of size l uniformly at random among all such sets. en:
P . (of Claim 3.5) (1) By the de nition of an XOS valuation, there is some additive valuation a such that a(N ) = C (N ). Moreover, for every S, C (S ) ≥ a(S ). Consider choosing at random a set T of size l.
Each element j is selected with probability l N . Let A j be the random variable that gets the value a({j}) if j is selected and 0 otherwise. Observe that:
(2) Let t = n l . Choose t disjoint sets T 1 , . . . ,T t each of size l, uniformly at random. If n does not divide l, construct an additional set T t +1 from taking N −∪ j T j in addition to l − |N −∪ j T j | items that are chosen uniformly at random. Now choose a set R by choosing one of the sets T 1 , . . . ,T n l uniformly at random. Notice that by subadditivity Σ
. e proposition follows since R is a set of size l which is chosen uniformly at random.
We can now prove Proposition 3.4. Fix S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ). Obtain a function C : 2 N → R by
Observe that if C is subadditive (XOS) then C is subadditive (XOS). For every l, let D (l ) = D ( S, l ) denote the expected density of a set of size l in C . Notice that by Claim 3.5 for XOS functions we have that D (l ) ≥ l n · C (N ). Now, if C is XOS, then:
e proof is similar if C is subadditive:
Let C be a monotone cost function. en, for every S, P C ( S ) ≤ H n · C ( S ).
. C is monotone, so for every S and l we have the following bound on the average density of a random set of size l: D( S, l ) ≤ C ( S ) l . us,
THE MAIN RESULT: THE POTENTIAL MECHANISM
In this section we present our main result, the Potential Mechanism. Speci cally, given a cost function C : 2 M 1 × . . . × 2 M n → R + and its potential function P C , de ne the Potential Mechanism be the following a ne maximizer:
We charge player i his VCG payment which is given by the formula:
is the allocation that maximizes (3) with the additional constraint ALG −i i = ∅. Note that there might be several allocations that maximize (3), hence the mechanism is de ned up to the implementation of a tie breaking rule. (1) When C is subadditive the mechanism provides an approximation ratio of 2H n to the social cost. When C is XOS (in particular, submodular) the mechanism provides an approximation ratio of H n to the social cost. (2) When C is submodular the mechanism is H n -budget-balanced in each of the following se ings: Notice that the potential mechanism exhibits a "one size ts all" property: the performance guarantees improve as the more restricted the functions are although the mechanism is de ned identically for all cost and valuation functions.
We note that strategyproofness, individual rationality, and no positive transfers of the potential mechanism follow directly from the properties of the VCG mechanism. e rest of the section is devoted to proving that the mechanism always recovers the cost and is approximately e cient and budget balanced in certain se ings and in Section 6 we discuss some of the limitations of the potential mechanism.
The Potential Mechanism: Cost Recovering and E iciency L 4.2. e potential mechanism always covers the incurred cost, i.e. for every outcome − −− → ALG, p , it holds that p i ≥ C ( − −− → ALG).
P . e payment of player i is given by:
ALG i is one of the alternatives that are considered for ALG −i , therefore
summing over all players, we get
where the last equality is by the de nition of the potential function.
Next we analyze the e ciency guarantees of the mechanism. For completeness in the full version we prove guarantees for both the social cost and additive approximations, although the la er implies the former [23] . Let C be a subadditive cost function. en the approximation ratio of the Potential Mechanism to the social cost is 2H n . If C is XOS then the approximation ratio improves to H n .
Interestingly, up until now we have not used the property that the M i 's are disjoint. at is, consider the usual se ing of a combinatorial auction with n players and a set of M items. Let C be a function that speci es the cost of every allocation. e same proofs imply that the potential mechanism always recovers the cost in this general se ing. Furthermore, if C is subadditive then the output is approximately e cient. Most of the technical di culty in the proof of eorem 4.1 is showing that the mechanism is H n -budget-balanced. We have already shown that the potential mechanism always cover the cost (Lemma 4.2). We remain with showing that the sum of payments of the mechanism is bounded from above by H n times the incurred cost. 
Recall that the potential mechanism is de ned up to a tie-breaking rule. For supermodular valuations and n = 2 the proofs below work directly for any tie breaking rule. For the symmetric se ing, we start with an arbitrary tie-breaking rule and modify it. We prove budget balance for the modi ed tie-breaking rule and see that this implies budget balance for the original tie breaking rule. e modi ed rule is de ned as follows: for every player i de ne an arbitrary order on M i and denote its elements as M i = 1 i , . . . , |M i | i . If player i gets s items in the original rule then allocate player i items {1 i , . . . , s i }. Notice that due to symmetry all costs and values remain the same, so this new allocation still maximizes the a ne maximizer. Finally, observe that since that player i is always indi erent between the bundles he receives in the original and modi ed rules, we may assume that the price of these bundles is identical as well, so his payment remains the same. Hence, budget balance for the modi ed rule implies budget balance for the original rule as well.
In order to prove lemma 4.4 we use the following claim:
In each one of se ings (2a), (2b) and (2c) of theorem 4.1:
Before providing the proof of claim 4.5 in subsection 4.1, we show how it implies lemma 4.4. P . (of lemma 4.4) Consider the sum of the payments:
 by claim 4.5 the RHS is bounded from above by:
re-arranging, we observe that n i=1 j ∈N \{i } j (ALG j ) = (n − 1) · n j=1 j (ALG j ). erefore the above equals to:
By proposition 3.6 we get that P C (
Proof of Claim 4.5
e proof consists of several steps: Claim 4.7 shows a lower bound on n i=1 P C ( − −−−− → ALG −i ), Claim 4.8 gives an upper bound on n i=1 j ∈N j (ALG −i j ) for supermodular valuations and n = 2, and claim 4.9 gives a similar bound for the symmetric se ing. e following technical claim will be used: such that for every i, T i ∈ 2 M and n i=1 T i = ∅. Suppose that either (1) H is supermodular or (2) for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,
P . If H is supermodular, then beginning with the rst two summands of the LHS of the claim, by supermodularity of H:
shi ing our focus to H (T 1 ∩ T 2 ) and the third summand H (T 3 ) yields
iterating the above for n times shows
T i since n i=1 T i = ∅ and H (∅) = 0, the claim follows. If T i ∪ T j ∈ {T i ,T j } for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, then without loss of generality when T i ∪ T j = T j we have that T i ∩ T j = T i . us, a similar proof can be applied on T i i ∈N with strict equality. e next claim bounds the sum of the P C 's as they appear in Claim 4.5. C 4.7. Suppose that the cost function C is submodular and normalized, then
Since C is submodular, by Proposition 3.3 it holds that P C is submodular as well. Hence, −P C is supermodular and we can apply Claim 4.6 with −P C and 
Observe that if the i 's are supermodular then V is supermodular as well. Applying claim 4.6 with V and
For n = 2 we have that:
Suppose that each i is symmetric and C is a player-wise symmetric cost function. en:
. We prove the claim assuming the tie breaking rule described earlier. Consider the LHS of the claim and change the order of summation:
Fix player j and consider n i=1 j (ALG −i j ). By the implementation, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ALG −i j = {1 j , . . . , |ALG −i j | j }. erefore, for every 1 ≤ i, k ≤ n it holds that
Moreover, since ALG −j j = ∅, n i=1 ALG −i j = ∅. Applying claim 4.6 on j and ALG −i
Summing over all players, we get
Changing the order of summation, the RHS equals to
We can now nish the proof of claim 4.5.
P . (of claim 4.5) By combining claims 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9: 
LIMITATIONS OF VCG-BASED MECHANISMS
In this section we discuss some limitations of VCG-based mechanisms. We rst ask whether our analysis of the potential mechanism is tight and prove that this is indeed the case. Our result is in fact more general: no symmetric VCG-based mechanism can do much be er. We then show that the potential function is the "minimal" choice for H (·) in the a ne maximizer in a concrete technical sense. A word is in place regarding the de nition of an a ne maximizer. In general an a ne maximizer does not have to maximize over all allocations. is can be implemented by se ing H ( S ) = ∞ for an allocation S that is never selected by the a ne maximizer. However, it is more convenient to work with a function H that is monotone.
is can be assumed without loss of generality: suppose that there is S, j ∈ M such that H ( S ) > H ( S + {j}). Note that by the monotonicity of the valuations this implies that the a ne maximizer never outputs S. To make H monotone, we can set H ( S ) = H ( S + {j}) -we still have that the a ne maximizer always gives higher value to S + {j} and in case of equality we can assume that S is not selected by de ning an appropriate tie breaking rule.
A Lower Bound for Symmetric VCG-Based Mechanisms. We show that every VCG-based mechanism that always covers the cost and uses a symmetric function does not provide be er guarantees than the potential mechanism for the excludable public good problem. Note that the potential mechanism is symmetric in this se ing since the potential function is symmetric if C is symmetric. T 5.1. Let A be a VCG-based mechanism for the excludable public good problem. I.e. A is a mechanism that outputs ALG = arg max
where H : 2 N → R + ∪ {∞} is normalized, monotone and symmetric function (i.e. for every two allocations S,T ⊆ N with |S | = |T | it holds that H (S ) = H (T )). Suppose that A always covers the cost and provides an approximation ratio of ρ < n (1−δ )/2 4 to the social cost, for some constant 0 < δ < 1. en, there is an instance in which the good is constructed at cost 1, the sum of payments is at least 1−δ 2 · log n − 1 and the approximation ratio to the social cost is no be er than (δ · log n − 1). In order to prove the theorem, we need the following claim. Proof is in the full version. C 5.2. Let A be a VCG-based mechanism for the excludable public good problem where H : 2 N → R + is normalized, monotone and symmetric. Suppose that A always covers the cost and provides a nite approximation ratio ρ to the social cost. en, for every S ⊆ N and i ∈ S it holds that H (S ) − H (S − {i}) ≥ 1 |S | .
We now turn to proving eorem 5.1. P . (of theorem 5.1) Note that since the mechanism provides a ρ approximation, H (N ) < ∞. Otherwise, for every i, set i = 2ρ. e optimal social cost is 1, serve all players, but at least one player is excluded so π ( − −− → ALG) ≥ 2ρ, a contradiction. Fix a set S ⊆ N of size n 1−δ . We now divide the analysis, depending on whether there is some set T , with |T | < n (1−δ )/2 such that H (T )
|T | ≤ H (S ) |S | . Assume that there is a set T with |T | < n (1−δ )/2 such that H (T )
|T | ≤ H (S ) |S | . In this case we get that H (S ) ≥ n (1−δ )/2 · H (T ). By the monotonicity of H and claim 5.2 it holds that H (T ) ≥ H ({1}) ≥ 1, therefore H (S ) ≥ n (1−δ )/2 .
Choose an arbitrary set S ⊆ N with S = 2 · n 1−δ < n. Consider the following valuation pro le: set i = 1 4·n (1−δ )/2 if i ∈ S , and i = 0 otherwise. Observe that in this pro le the mechanism does not output a set of size more than n 1−δ : consider some set S ⊆ S with |S | ≥ n 1−δ . By monotonicity of H it holds that H (S ) ≥ H (S ) ≥ n (1−δ )/2 . Moreover it holds that i ∈S i ≤ 2 · n 1−δ · 1 4·n (1−δ )/2 ≤ n (1−δ )/2 2 , hence i ∈S i − H (S ) < 0. erefore, the mechanism outputs a set of size at most n 1−δ , meaning that at least n 1−δ players among S with value 1 4·n (1−δ )/2 are not served. We get that the optimal optimal allocation is π (OPT ) = π (N ) = 1, but the social cost of the output of the mechanism is at least n (1−δ )/2 4 . Hence the approximation ratio of the mechanism is no be er than n (1−δ )/2 4 . erefore, from now on assume that for every T with |T | < n (1−δ )/2 it holds that H (T )
|T | > H (S ) |S | . We construct a valuation pro le in which the mechanism does not serve players whose sum of values is at least δ · log n − 1, hence the approximation ratio of the social cost is no be er than δ · log n − 1. In addition, in the same pro le the total sum of payments that the mechanism collects is at least 1−δ 2 · log n − 1. Let W be the minimal set that minimizes the density H (W ) |W | among all sets of size at most n 1−δ , i.e., for every W ⊂ W it holds that H (W ) |W | < H (W ) |W | . Notice that |W | ≥ n (1−δ )/2 , since the density of S, which is of size |S | = n 1−δ , is smaller than the density of any set of size at most n (1−δ )/2 . . We get that i ∈W i > H (W ), but for every W ⊂ W , it holds that i ∈W i = |W | · H (W ) |W | + ε < |W | · H (W ) |W | + H (W ) − |W | · H (W ) |W | = H (W ). In addition, consider a set L ⊆ N \W , with n − n 1−δ players. Without loss of generality, L = n 1−δ + 1, n 1−δ + 2, ..., n . For every i ∈ L set i = 1 i − ε. We observe that the mechanism outputs ALG = W and that for every i ∈ W , ALG −i = ∅: by claim 5.2, for any two disjoint sets W , L ⊆ N , H (W ∪ L ) − H (W ) ≥ |W |+ |L | i= |W |+1 1 i , therefore for every subset L ⊆ L and for every subset W ⊆ W (which is of size at most n 1−δ ) the mechanism prefers the allocation W over W ∪ L : 
